Introduction
The proposed Belo Monte hydropower dam complex on the River Xingu in Brazil's Amazon region is the second largest in the country, and the world's third largest in terms of installed capacity (11,200 megawatts) after Itaipu and the Three Gorges Dam in China. As the focus of intense conflict for more than three decades, even while still on the drawing board, Belo Monte is emblematic of the continuing struggle between the competing demands of Brazil's rapidly modernising economy and the conservation of its forests and natural resources.
This confrontation has been overseen by successive government administrations since the project was originally conceived in the 1970s, a mantle now inherited by Dilma Rousseff, and one that will no doubt be passed on to her successor(s) through this and other hydro-schemes planned for the Amazon. As
Minister of Mines and Energy under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Rousseff was famously bullish in her support for infrastructure building to accelerate the development process with (if her critics are to be believed) little apparent regard for the environmental and social impacts on Amazonia's rainforest and local populations.
During her initial months as President, however, she will have discovered that in executing such mega-projects the exigencies of all stakeholders, not just those of powerful politicians and national economic policy-makers, must be accommodated if turmoil is to be avoided, or at least ameliorated. Belo Monte thus serves as an instructive example of the potential dangers and pitfalls of top-down 2 planning and failure to incorporate provisions for adequate consultation, participation, compensation and comprehensive resettlement. Yet Belo Monte is by no means the first such case in Brazil, and it remains to be seen to what extent its lessons will be internalised and acted upon in the future.
For the present, however, rather like a medieval jousting tournament, the battle lines at Belo Monte have been firmly drawn. On one side is the powerful prodam lobby, comprising construction companies driven by commercial interests and an ideological commitment to such projects as symbols of modernization and development. This approach is supported by the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), the federal and regional electricity authorities (Eletrobrás and Eletronorte respectively), as well as numerous consulting firms, construction companies and academic interests, together with the international aluminum industry, all in the name of development.
On the other side, lances poised, is an increasingly vociferous set of local, 
Background
Belo Monte, originally known as Kararaô, was first planned in the 1970s, but was soon shelved due to controversy, only to be resuscitated in the 1980s by President Sarney. In 1989 a massive and now famous meeting was staged at the nearby town of Altamira, opposing proposals for the six-dam complex, which was part of ambitious plans published by the national power authority Eletrobrás to construct almost 300 dams by 2010. 2 The 'First Encounter of the Indigenous Nations of the Xingu' attracted environmentalists from all over the world, including Sting, the British pop star. This meeting drew international attention to the potentially negative impacts of the scheme and to the sheer strength of local opposition. The most dramatic single image to emerge from this tumultuous gathering was that of Tuíra, a female indigenous leader, angrily waving a machete in the face of engineer José Antônio Muniz Lópes (later President of Eletronorte), which had worldwide repercussions and probably influenced further postponement of the project.
A second feasibility study presented three options for a smaller complex based on a run-of-the-river model rather than the huge reservoirs envisaged in earlier plans. Under the latest design, two canals would divert water away from indigenous reserves into two reservoirs to prevent flooding. Electricity would be generated using three dams: Belo Monte (90 metres high/3,545 metres long), (36/6,248) and Bela Vista (33/351), with two power stations at Belo Monte (generating 11,000 MW) and Pimentel (233 MW). 4 The total inundated area under these new proposals would be reduced from 1,225 to 440 square kilometres. Costing some R$20 billion (US$12 billion) Belo Monte is justified within the national 'Plan for Accelerated Development' (PAC) as essential for filling an estimated energy gap of 5-8 per cent a year, for both industrial and domestic purposes; notably to satisfy heavy, subsidized consumers such as the regional aluminum and iron and steel industries. The human rights commission eventually withdrew its condemnation of Brazil's actions, and an environmental licence for the construction of Belo Monte was issued. Further legal challenges followed, however, and in late September 2011 a federal judge again ordered works to be halted, this time on the grounds that fish stocks on the River Xingu could be damaged. Yet given the determination of the Brazilian government to go to almost any lengths to push ahead with the project, it seems unlikely at the time of writing that the dam will be permanently stopped by a judicial challenge.
Pimentel

Potential impacts of Belo Monte
Hydropower, which currently meets 80 per cent of Brazil's energy needs, is often portrayed as environmentally benign and a fundamental prerequisite for the country's development. However, there are trade-offs whose costs are not usually incorporated into wider economic calculations by the vested interests behind such schemes as Belo Monte. Opposition to this and other dam projects has been voiced on economic, environmental and social grounds.
It is claimed, for example, that the economic efficiency of Belo Monte will be compromised by the fact that, due to seasonal fluctuations in river flow, the project will be forced to operate below capacity for much of the year. In order to be financially viable, it is suggested that further dams would have to be built While Belo Monte will create employment for over 18,000 laborers directly, and perhaps 25,000 jobs indirectly, there is also a wider multiplier effect. If the Tucuruí and Carajás experience is anything to go by, Belo Monte will act as a giant population magnet, attracting up to 100,000 migrants in search of work. This will fuel land speculation, placing pressure on fragile forest resources and creating major problems for the already overstretched economic and social urban infrastructure in towns such as Altamira. For example, IBAMA has estimated that Belo Monte could lead to the deforestation of more than 5,000 square kilometres of rainforest over a 20-year period (Amazônia, 25 April 2011) . Flooding of the 10 rainforest will also reduce biodiversity stocks and alter fish migration routes.
Decomposition of flooded vegetation may produce large quantities of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas, as foliage gradually decays under the rising waters, as has happened elsewhere in the region. These ecological impacts have been routinely documented in comparable Amazon dam projects such as Tucuruí. 5 They are likely to be exacerbated by unregulated heightening of the dam water level 'through the back door' as the result of obfuscation and underhand tactics deployed by the pro-dam lobby. 6 
Wider implications of Belo Monte
The hotly contested debate about Belo Monte needs to be placed in a broader context, for the project is indicative not only of the model of development that was pursued under the Lula government but also of the way in which key decisions about development were taken and are still taken under the Rousseff administration. The PT came to power when state capitalism was widely discredited throughout the world, partly because of the collapse of the USSR in the late 1980s. Yet many strategic thinkers in the PT (including President Rousseff) had been revolutionaries in their youth and still defined themselves as 'socialist'.
While accepting that it was no longer feasible to think of the state owning the 'means of production', they believed that Brazil should learn from the success of other countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, where the state had played a key role in steering development. They were particularly impressed by South Korea's ability to promote research and to patent new products and ideas, about which 11 they spoke admiringly in policy documents drawn up before Lula's inauguration in
2003.
As a result, the two Lula administrations (January 2003 -December 2010 deliberately set out to increase the role of the state in the economy, believing that the neo-liberal reforms adopted by Lula's predecessor, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, had given too free a rein to large economic groups, both national and international. However, rather than building up the state as a strong, autonomous power with its own separate interests, as would have happened under state capitalism, the Lula government decided, instead, to use the state machine to pour huge sums of money into a tiny, carefully selected group of companies so that they could become powerful corporations, broadly similar to the Japanese keiretsu and the South Korean chaebols. The objective was to create corporations that could compete as equals with the biggest companies in the world.
Again, somewhat surprisingly, the Lula administrations did not seek to influence decision-making in these corporations but merely to give them the economic clout to pursue their own interests. As some analysts have put it, 'Rather than the state assuming once again a key role in the economy, what we have seen is an alignment of the state to the dynamic and demands of large entrepreneurial groups with solid positions in the market before the Lula government.' 7 In his article in this collection, Alfredo Saad-Filho has dubbed the term 'neodevelopmentalism' for this new form of state intervention (Alfredo Saad-Filho 2011). He also points out that neo-developmentalism has not replaced neoliberalism but coexists alongside it. 12 One of the main ways in which the state has increased its presence is by beefing up the role of the BNDES, which was greatly strengthened, with loans increasing from R$35.10 billion (US$21.91 billion) in 2003 to R$168.40 billion (US$105.10 billion) in 2010. As a result, annual disbursements from the BNDES are today worth more than twice the combined expenditures of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. 8 Since 2005, three-quarters of the loans have been channelled to big companies in sectors regarded as key by the government, such as mining, ethanol, paper and pulp, oil and gas, hydroelectric power and farming. 9 It is largely thanks to this BNDES funding that giant Brazilian economic groups have been formed; examples include JBS-Friboi, which after a series of take-overs of other companies in the sector has become the world's largest beef processor, and Brasil Foods, formed from the merger of Sadia and Perdigão, which is today one of the world's largest food groups. Indeed, although the function of the BNDES is to promote the country's social development along with its economic development, only a tiny proportion of its resources are channelled into education The Brazilian government is confident that it can prevent big projects, including both dams and mines, doing widespread damage to the ecosystem, but many environmentalists are far less confident. The Brazilian government intends to build more than 60 large dams in the Amazon basin over the next 20 years to supply its national electric grid. 12 As yet, the authorities have never managed to prevent a disorderly and environmentally destructive influx of loggers, cattle companies, agribusiness and peasant farmers when it has opened up a region for development and, despite the government's growing efforts to protect large areas of forest by creating reserves and parks, few Brazilian environmentalists are confident that they will be more successful in the future.
Moreover, as noted above and contrary to widespread belief, hydroelectric power stations are not environmentally friendly, particularly in tropical regions.
Brazil's National Institute for Space Research (INPE) has calculated that the world's 52,000 large dams emit 104 million metric tonnes of methane annually 17 from reservoir surfaces, turbines, spillways and rivers downstream (Lima, Ramos, Bambace, Rosa 2007: 193-206) . This implies that dam methane emissions are responsible for at least four per cent of the total warming impact of human activities. Fearnside, who has extensively researched dams' greenhouse gas emissions, found that releases from Curuá-Una in Pará state were 3.5 times higher than they would have been if a fossil-fuel-burning counterpart had produced the electricity. 
